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BALUGAWHALE EASY GAME PDF

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There are a lot of books about poker, particularly about the game that has become a modern phenomenon: No-Limit Texas Hold 'em. The legend Doyle Brunson. Easy Game. Making Sense of No Limit Hold 'em. Vol. 2. Easy Game Vol. coach on the BalugaWhale Team, happens to be one of the best in the world. Easy Game 3rd Edition by Andrew Seidman - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text All of these hands were played at $10/$20 or $25/$) balugawhale is BB.


Balugawhale Easy Game Pdf

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Andrew (Balugawhale) Seidman ~ Easy Game Volume III (p) - Download as PDF File .pdf), Text File .txt) or read online. Download Andrew (Balugawhale) Seidman ~ Easy Game Volume III (p). That said, I torrented a PDF of it and only after I saw how much value it Easy Game is $52 on site. . He his the coach balugawhale.

Betting just because you probably have the best hand is NOT sufficient to bet for value. This is defined as betting to get a better hand to fold. Betting just because you cant win any other way is NOT sufficient to bet as a bluff. These two are pretty simple. They rely on mistakes our opponents makeeither calling too much or folding too much.

Its human nature to call too much. Were curious beings and we want to see what the other guy holds, what the turn card will be, whether or not we hit our flush on the river. People are more inclined to make the mistake of calling too much than the mistake of folding too much.

Therefore, Reason 1 for betting will dominate our bets. Value-betting is, was, and always will be the best way to make money. In general, though, even regulars at high stakes games are more likely to make bad calls than bad folds as a general rule.

So what about c-betting? Lets say we raised KQo on the button, and the big blind a loose, passive player who wont fold ANY pair on the flop calls us. The flop comes down A75r. He checks to us. This is a very standard bet. We cant get called by any worse hands QJ isnt coming along for the ride.

Even a hand like 86 is roughly a coin-flip against us in terms of equity. So we cant bet for value. Sticking with our assumption that hes not folding any pairs, we cant bet as a bluff either as we have the best non-pair hand possible. Yet we still bet. Capitalization of Dead Money. This is defined as making the opponent fold, whether his hand is better or worse, and collecting the money in the pot. This is obviously a fair amount trickier than Reasons 1 or 2. What makes this mysterious third reason work?

On the A75 flop where we hold KQ, if the opponent holds JT, his six-outer still has a strong amount of equity to draw out. Making him fold that equity share is good.

One exception would be if the villain is likely to bluff AND our hand is strong enough to call a potential bluff. On this A75 board, if we check behind on the flop, villain is likely to check all of his air-type hands and bet all of his pair-or-better hands. Thus, villain is unlikely to bluff and our hand isnt strong enough to be a bluff catcher, so we cant check behind. More on this concept later in the chapter Showdown Theory.

I was playing at a high stakes table with a very famous, extremely loose-aggressive player named Cole. He was deepstacked in the CO, covered by the Button. Cole raised, the Button 3-bet, he 4-bet, the Button 5-bet, and he shoved all-in.

The Button folded, and Cole showed T9o. Cole obviously wasnt raising all-in for value hard to get called by nine-high. Nor could he be confident about making the Button fold anything good, as Cole is famously loose and aggressivenobody folds anything good to Cole.

Yet he still raised. After the button 5-bets, there is a lot of dead money in the pot. Cole only needs the Button to fold a relatively small percentage of the time to make the shove correct As games get more aggressive, more people are bluffing and putting money in with weaker hands.

That equates to the presence of more dead money in the pot. In small stakes games, c-betting may be the extent of your reason 3 betting as in KQ on an A75 board. This is because people rarely get out of line and make plays without some kind of hand.

In higher stakes, more aggressive games, youll need to capitalize on dead money if you want to turn a profit. Often times it is used as a complimentary reason for Reasons 1 and 2. For example, lets say we have the nut flush draw on a T84K board and we decide to bet the turn. Well, were betting for Reason 2, hoping for him to fold a hand like JT or A8. He may have a worse hand, such as a worse flush draw, which we dont want him to fold necessarily.

However, the fact that there is money in the pot, and we might get him to fold a hand like JT means that its not so bad for him to fold a worse hand. Another example might be a situation where we have KT and the board is T65J. Betting again might be slightly too thin.. However, getting him to fold straight draws, flush draws, and random floats is good for us, especially if we think he usually takes a free card with his draws if we check.

In general, dead money compensates for the thinness of either Reason 1 or Reason 2. For example, a bluff might be too thin i. However, if the pot were bb, a bluff has more value because theres more dead money to make.

Similarly, a thin value bet might be too thin with a small pot size, but with a larger pot the dead money compensates.

In this sense, were always betting for Reason 1 or Reason 2, but Reason 3 is always involved. Even when we raise preflop, were either raising as a bluff or for value, but our raise is compensated by the dead moneydead money that we call the blinds. So what about protection? Is this not a reason for betting? The answer is noprotection is a consequence of betting. Lets say our hand is red QQ on a QT9 board. We bet for valuethere are many worse hands that will call or raise us.

The fact that were charging draws and protecting is nice, but its hardly the original motivation for our bet. Now lets say we hold 66 on a Q93 board. We can bet there to collect dead money, but were hardly protecting. The moral of the story is that when we have a set of queens, our hand needs protection, but it needs value first and foremost. When we have a pair of sixes, our hand doesnt really need protection because its not very strong.

All we have is a pair of sixes. It seems pretty dumb to protect ourselves from AJ when AJ is a favorite over us. Instead, we might bet 66 on the Q93 board as a thin bluff against hands like 77 or 88 or for thin value against a hand like A4 , but mostly to collect dead money against a hand like AT that will fold its 6-outer on the flop.

What about information? Lets say we have QJ on a QT5r board against a very loose-passive player. We bet for value. If he calls, we have the information that our hand is probably best and we can keep betting for value. If he raises, we have the information that our hand is behind his range and we should fold.

However, the bet is still good even if that happens, because it was for value. The real problem with betting for information occurs when someone bets a hand like KK on an A22 board. Every time he folds we were ahead. He plays perfectly. And, if hes not making any mistakes, were not making any money. If were betting for information instead of one of the three reasons, were usually isolating ourselves with better hands and folding out worse hands. In short, were making mistakes and our opponent isnt.

And thats bad. However, lets consider the KK on A22 example again. Lets start with a two assumptions: 1 if we bet, villain never calls with a worse hand, and 2 if we check, villain NEVER bluffs.

In this case, it may still be correct to bet to collect dead money. Lets say that villain holds a hand like If hes never bluffing when we check, were simply giving him infinite odds to catch his 4. So, betting to make 44 fold there is a good thing, because we make him fold his equity share in a spot where he only puts money in the pot when hes value betting.

Obviously, these two assumptions are never this concretesometimes we can bet KK for value on an A22 board against smaller pairs, and sometimes our villain will bluff us like crazy if we check. But, we need to remain conscious of dead money as it applies to these types of situations. So now we have the three reasons. Any time youre betting, ask yourself, Why am I betting?

Once you realize that there are only three answers, poker will suddenly make a lot more sense. Knowing how to think about value-betting is critical. Knowing not to bluff when your opponent wont fold any better hands is also important.

However, Reason 3 always seemed difficult to put into words for me. Ive always felt uncomfortable trying to explain Reason 3, and eventually I boiled it down into a simple example.

Here is the situation: I raise AQ, villain reraises, I 4bet all-in, and while hes thinking he accidentally shows me that hes holding I want him to foldthis is a clear example of Reason 2. I want him to fold a hand with better pot equity than me. Now, lets look at the counterpoint: I raise 88, villain reraises, I 4bet all-in, and while hes thinking he accidentally shows me that hes holding AQ. What do I want now? I still want him to fold. So, sometimes I want my opponent to fold the worst hand.

This caused me to redefine reason 2 for betting: Reason 2: Bluffing means betting to make your opponent fold a hand incorrectly. Incorrectly means that if he could see your cards, he wouldnt fold. Sometimes folding incorrectly adheres to the classic version of Reason 2 we have J9 and he has QJ and he folds preflop to our 3bet , but other times it simply means he folded a hand he had odds to call with our opponent folds 67 on JT23 to our 2nd barrel with AK.

Lastly, it could mean our opponent folds a hand that they could have re-bluffed us with we 3bet J9o and he folds 76s, but if he had 4-bet we would have folded.

This is clearly a much broader vision of the concept of bluffing. Not only does this help us avoid making bets to capitalize on dead money which end up being incorrect as either a value-bet or a bluff, but it gives us much greater license to consider bluffing in spots that we might previously have avoided.

Once upon a time, raising a J83 flop with 66 might have seemed bad no worse calls, no better folds , but when we consider the various pieces of equity hell fold not to mention the things he might fold on later streetsmore on this in the chapter Street Projection we might be able to start justifying aggression.

The words we use are important. When something takes too long to explain, that means its probably too complicated to use in a time-sensitive environment. Any time you take an action at a poker table, you should be able to explain it in 20 seconds worth of timeonline, thats all the time youll get in the first place.

Now that Im done with Reason 3, everything is either a bluff or a value-bet. My mind is clearer, my choices are easier. Killing Reason 3 makes a world of difference.

The remaining content of Chapter One is still the foundation upon which poker understanding rests. Knowing how to quickly define value betting and bluffing is the first step to playing good, rational poker. The variables are greatly reducedonly two cards per person are in play.

Unlike postflop where situations become extremely complex and difficult, preflop is easiest to deal with. Yet every student Ive ever coached has begun with one major preflop leaktheyre not thinking about postflop. To the average poker thinker, preflop is a vacuum in which we can raise K2o on the button because our hand is stronger than the range of the blinds. The dead money from when the blinds fold easily compensates for raising 72o.

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Oh thats right 72o is terrible postflop. K2o isnt too far behind. The difficulty most players have with making money without going to showdown stems from their inability to play a well-formulated preflop game that is cohesive with their overall postflop strategy. There is a gap between their preflop plan and their postflop plan. In short, theyre not thinking about equity.

Lets explain. We hold K8o on the button. Our initial thought is to raise because our range is ahead of the blinds and we can collect dead money. So lets say we raise and the big blind calls. The flop comes down The blind checks, we make a standard c-bet, and the blind calls.

The turn card is the 2. The blind checks again. Boy-oh-boy do we have a conundrum. If we check it back, well inevitably go to showdown with a weak hand and well lose a decent pot. Seems pretty weak on our part. Or, we could bet but the turn card isnt scary and hes unlikely to fold anything he called the flop with. Betting is often overly aggressive chip-spewy.

The real problem with the postflop spot starts all the way back preflop. We chose a hand with poor postflop equity and thus we walk into unprofitable spotssituations where theres simply nothing we can do right. Theres an easy solution though: choose hands that have good postflop equity.

What kind of cards are these? Suited cards are a good place to startthey have great postflop equity. When I say this, most peoples immediate reaction is to tell me that suited cards only make a flush a small percentage of the time. Thats true, but lets think about it in terms of equity: On the left we have A6. On the right we have A6.

We raise the button preflop, and the big blind calls again. Thats significant. But come on, how often do we really flop a flush anyway? Agreed lets change the flop then Most importantly, though, lets consider a flop of We bet and are called.

The turn is a Q. A6s now has 12 outs. A6o has 3. Now, with the extra equity, we can stay aggressive. Thus, unlike A6o where we have to choose between being weak or spewy we can be appropriately aggressive with A6s. Well talk about this more in the next chapter.

High cards also have great equity. Lets consider AQo. If we flop an A or Q, we usually have the best hand. However, on the vast majority of flops we miss, we are guaranteed six overcard outs.

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Often, thats enough equity to continue aggression. Connecting cards provide equity as well, although not as significantly as suited or high cards. They do have advantages, as straights are among the most disguised hands in poker, but they have plenty of disadvantages as well. If there is a flush draw on the board, a straight draws outs may be tainted.

A straight draw has only 8 outs compared with a flush draw which has 9, or the nut flush draw which sits with If we turn a straight draw, usually its a card that makes the board more coordinated and thus harder to stay aggressive on. An example would be JT on a K75Q board. The draw is nice, but we probably wont be able to stay aggressive on such a strong turn card for our opponents range KQ comes to mind. Thats a very difficult spot for us to continue aggression despite our hands strong equity.

In understanding all of this, we see that hands like A3s are extremely strong, mixing suited value, high card value, and connecting value. In fact, A2s-A5s are generally stronger than A6s-A9s, as the extra connecting card value usually more than compensates for the extra high card value i.

Hands like 76s are strong as well, despite having no high card value. So are hands like KJo, despite having no suited value. Aggression comes with a lot of advantages: we win bigger pots with our strong hands, we make our opponents fold the best hand, we collect dead money constantly, and it makes it difficult for our opponents to read our hand.

Now that we know which cards put us in spots that let us stay aggressive, we can start to consider common spots where we have equity and want to keep applying pressure. Addendum I have a lot to say about this chapter. That said, I torrented a PDF of it and only after I saw how much value it brought to my game did I legitimately download a copy because I felt it was worth it. It is up to you. Here's the first 45 pages in PDF online.

Why isn't it worth the price? Would the expectation value of reading this book be more than the price? If not, then it's not a particularly good book. He his the coach balugawhale. Videos are x times easier to learn from than an overpriced book.

Thank you for this! I always like to see the first quarter of a book to decide if I'm going to download it or not. Now if only I could find a copy of Playing the Player. Use of this site constitutes acceptance of our User Agreement and Privacy Policy. All rights reserved. Want to join?

Log in or sign up in seconds. Submit a new link. Submit a new text post. Easy game. In the meantime. I raise preflop. This limits his value range tremendously and keeps his NAR extremely air-heavy. We check and he fires a c-bet. Understanding NARs can help us in some very tricky spots against good aggressive players.

If we ignore NARs we can be tempted into folding our hand due solely to its absolute value i. Even when we are behind. Many villains here will fire their whole range. If his NAR is air-heavy. If a good-aggressive player turns into a bad-aggressive player. If he was unlikely to c-bet an Ace on the flop. We check. Passive players have virtually no bluffs in that spot.

Chapter Seven: This gives us improved implied odds. This may mean c-betting Ace high in some of those spots or value-betting thinly with a pair of threes on The turn card is an Ace. We feel sad. Upper echelon players will be careful to manage their NARs so that they are difficult to read. More common than the bad-aggressive player with the wildly air-heavy NAR is the passive player with an extremely nuts-heavy NAR.. KT has six overcards and decent equity against his value range.

How lightly should we call? For the purpose of this example. If you have AA against a passive player on a JT75 board. A lot of spots. In practice. Keeping an eye on how often you bluff versus how often you value-bet is vital. To some. Against some people.

When you play more loosely than your opponent. I prefer to think of balance as a consequence of trying to make the correct choice in each specific instance.

He said. Chapter Eight: I had a student fold K4s UTG. Our ability to make mistakes less often than our opponents and to force our opponents into mistakes increases the value of our hand. When a weak player is playing hands like J6o. I told him he was making a mistake. In truth. Every time we get involved in a pot. When there is more money behind relative to the pot-size. Aces have so much card advantage that. Understanding and exploiting those advantages is called isolation. To raise or reraise preflop in order to play a pot with a particular player or players.

If we raise too loosely to isolate. Playing a pot in position against a bad player is easily worth the risk of playing OOP with K4s. Skill advantage makes the difference. What cards should we choose? Isolation is predicated on three advantages: We want to play pots with weak players.

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When we are in position. The least important of all advantages is card advantage. Position comes in 2nd. Aces are that good. The worse they are. At a poker table. I have J7s and a tight BB calls my button raise. Understanding why and how we isolate is the way we can target different types of players and take advantage of their mistakes. So what types of cards should we isolate with when we loosen up our range?

The concept remains alright though—we do make more money playing hands against fish than regulars. So if you want to start loosening up. If you have a shortstacker on your left. The obvious play here is to check to the raiser. If you have a loose. This is the essence of table dynamics postflop. We call in the blinds with To explain this. But as soon as the fish limps. With a bad player in the blinds on your left. We call with 55 in the blinds. We want to do whatever we can to keep the fish in the pot.

My strong belief is that 3-betting in that spot is the incorrect play. On the flip side. The same principle applies to No-Limit. So why are we trying to isolate ourselves with the guy who plays pretty well?

Understanding table dynamics keeps us from making these mistakes. Chapter Nine: Table Dynamics Some circumstances on a poker table are beyond our control.

I was once involved in a large discussion about whether or not to 3-bet QJs from the blinds after a fish limps and a regular raises. If there are a number of shorter stacked players at your table. These are just a few examples of how game dynamics might change your overall strategy. A fish limps in MP. If there are no fish involved.

What factors do we need to consider to understand table dynamics? Suddenly you need to change your strategy. The fish calls as well. Each table will have a distinct combination of player types. Having a good regular on your left and a fish on your right is very different than having a good regular on your right and a fish on your left. The flop is J52 again. These factors. A regular open-raises on the button.

If you have a big fish on your right. In this scenario. This way. If we 3-bet. If the regular checks. In that case. How different types of players play.

To make the best decisions. If the regular bets and the fish raises. This would mean continuing to play loosely ourselves but not giving up against his aggression. The only potentially difficult spot comes when the regular holds a stronger top-pair or an overpair and decides to call our flop bet.

The flip side of this scenario comes when a regular raises in MP and a fish calls on the button. If the regular bets and the fish calls. When you lead into a player you know is likely to call you the fish.

This time.

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Why not? First of all. If he has a set. The overall point of table dynamics is to understand that the best way to play a hand depends on more than just our cards. Too often we miss value from the fish. This means 4-betting.

If our opponents are 3-betting us a lot. Chapter Ten: The idea is that. A lot of my students worry about whether or not their changing raise size will give away information about their hand. I might raise to either 2x or 2. Against some of these opponents. I might minraise the button with two regs in the blinds. If there was a pro shortstacker and a bad player.

We can raise to one of three sizes: A Pot-Sized Raise is a pretty good default to have in general. For this reason. That information is public. As I mentioned above. The other half of the idea is that. As you can see. If I have one pro shortstack and one good regular in the blinds. We just mash pot and play from there. Like our positional advantage.

Not only does this maximize my skill advantage but it gives me a cheap price on my preflop blind-stealing bluff. I almost always try to make it as small as possible preflop. The larger the stack. We should be more flexible than that. The shorter the stack size. This refers to the way that desired value changes throughout the course of a hand. If we have A2 on an AQJ board. We will most likely need to check fold depending on how much is behind.

This refers to the amount of value that we want on any given action.

A lot of small stakes players misapply the concept. And yet. So far. He 4-bets. The turn is a 3o. We 5-bet. Chapter Eleven: Against this new range. If we have the nut flush postflop on an unpaired board. If we just want one bet on each street.

The flop is KQ9r. Anytime we have a hand. We bet the flop. Most of the time. Learning how desired value changes during each street in a hand is a difficult skill. A good example would occur when we raise AA and get called by a passive-bad player. I will be referring to the concept of controlling pot size as Pot Management. As discussed previously. I eventually decided to fold which I still think was the correct play. The flop came down r. I realized that the pot was now 4k.

In this chapter. He checked again. At this point. As soon as I saw the chips go in the middle. Bet flop. What about scenarios where we want to keep the pot small? I decided to keep it in the book because value-street feelings can be a helpful guide for a beginning player in understanding how to keep getting value and avoid paying off to a raise.

I tell my small stakes students this all the time—double your bet size. The pot-management discussion is very valuable. I learned about pot management the hard way. I sat and folded junk hands for a while. Fixing this problem will probably double your win-rate. An extremely good player raised in mid position.

Early in my high stakes career. As played. He check-raised quite large. I knew what was coming as soon as I saw the pot size—the opponent shoved all in. Most small stakes players struggle most with this concept. He checked. Sitting with 6k. The turn was a Jo. Advanced players. The odds of him having QQ there going for thin value against a J or of him turning a hand into a bluff should make it a no-brainer call as played. I debated removing that part of the chapter or even removing the chapter in its entirety due to its vagueness and confusing language.

I risk it checking through and losing a street of value. The process works for bluffing too. The flop is T We can fold comfortably and actually save ourselves money in this case by waiting until later to make our bluff. The flop is A I confidently shoved and he quickly folded.

If I were to ask you. I was sitting bb deep with an aggressive regular. In this example. Before you make a bet. He raised.

A regular opens on the cutoff. I considered strongly going all-in on the turn here as a bluff I had about a pot-sized bet remaining. Understanding that process will be useful in situations far more complex than deciding whether or not to make a flop c-bet. Chapter Twelve: He c-bet. I think there was a decent chance that he would have hero-called with AK on the turn. The river was a blank. On a board like T When he checks with a hand like I again decided to wait until later using the same process as I used in the A84 example above.

I ask myself. One such situation happened to me recently. In a world of increasing aggression. There are two reasons for this. People tend to feel increasingly uncomfortable as a hand progresses—they feel great about preflop. Those spots are what will make us creative and difficult to play against. If we have In the KK example. This should incline us to bet. Look back at Chapter One and the reasons for betting.

A portion of his hand range contains an Ace. We assume a few constants. What about. While our hand is very likely to be best. This concept is called range manipulation.

Once the flop comes down A When should I bet? We can definitely call at least one bet most of the time and be happy with the additional value. Understanding when to check behind and when to bet is the essence of showdown theory.

If we check. The flop comes down A22r. When should I check behind? KK is far more likely to win at showdown than 73o. So how do we preserve the value of our KK? What happens if we check behind instead of betting? Certainly we can bet to collect dead money reason 3. The classic example: We raise KK on the button and get called by the big blind.

Chapter Thirteen: Showdown Theory Knowing when to keep the pot small is easy at first. The brief answer is that KK has more value than 73o—as far as the action has gone thus far. When he called preflop. This is an automatic bet for value.

If you want to slowplay with AA on an A22 board.

This chapter is addressing showdown theory at its most basic level. In the spots that are truly close. In this respect. For now. The last discussion to be had regarding showdown theory revolves around the concept of turning a weak hand into a bluff.

To paraphrase Doyle Brunson: They bet the flop and get called. I see small stakes players make one big mistake time and time again when it comes to showdown theory. There are a ton of worse hands that can call on the turn. In the advanced section. Most of the time when we face a raise with a one-pair hand on a monotone board. I am coinflipping with him. Krantz bet the flop. Before we go any further.

Misunderstanding the overall scope of equity is an extremely common mistake. I was shocked and I felt more than a little bit outclassed at the time. On the one hand. For those interested. I still have significant equity against Krantz.

As his timer began to run down. I called this was probably a mistake. Just count on our opponents making the mistake of calling too often and value bet them.

Krantz would certainly have value-owned himself on the turn. On a monotone board. Chapter Fourteen: Monotone Boards and Equity Monotone boards are tricky.

Poker players often say. I should go all in. A moment ago. In terms of understanding the concept. Even in the complicated scenario. This is a pretty basic understanding of Gbucks in terms of equity. Chapter Fifteen: Until we hit the nosebleeds. Imagine playing a 6-max game where the dealer throws away six cards before he deals everyone in—in theory.

Raising A9o UTG in a 9-handed game is relatively suicidal. Chapter Sixteen: In a full-ring game. And it often has enough equity to continue aggression and make a lot of 1-pair hands fold on the turn. Positional Protection means the manipulation of perceived ranges to protect the value of your hand preflop. As long as our skill advantage compensates for our lack in card and positional advantage. Not because we should change our raising ranges dramatically between 6-max and full ring.

A set of fours. This is because our perceived range for raising in that position will generally be extremely tight. I was having a conversation with a really solid player about preflop raising ranges on the button.

Another vital factor that differentiates 6-max and Full Ring play is the change in emphasis on positional protection. This means that raising a hand like ATs. Shorthanded and Positional Protection Many players at small stakes begin with full ring games as opposed to short-handed games.

In one of my videos. It always makes the best straight. I asked him. There are a few reasons why we can afford to play loosely in a full ring game: There are a lot of psychological reasons behind this—full ring games promote a more conservative. In full-ring. In 6max. The difference is clear—in a 6-max game. Bad players are predictable enough to feel comfortable playing loosely against them.

I think we can play significantly looser than the commonly accepted super-tight strategies that are most usually applied in full-ring. If a good regular raises UTG. The significant difference is one of context—the tighter context of Full Ring means that we play back more tightly to aggression but also that we open our game more widely until we face aggression back at us.

Being able to adjust through different contexts is critical to understanding poker in any setting. This is often a fold. This allows us to play more hands profitably in position. The existence of three extra players is usually irrelevant.

In a 6-max game. When you consider that there are eight people left to act. Positional protection exists in a 6-max setting as well. By the same token. Full Ring. We still have to play tightly in general unless somebody begins to 3-bet us noticeably too often. The difficult thing about calling 3-bets OOP is that. To keep things simple and profitable for people playing in smaller stakes games. The blinds fold.

This was a mistake. Chapter Seventeen: An Introduction to 3-Bet Pots Originally. This leads us towards a major conclusion: We also are going to be forced to fold any A or K flop. Can we call OOP with one of these hands? If I 4-bet it and get it in. This is because 3-betting becomes much more difficult to deal with when playing against aggressive players who 3-bet at high frequencies and with wide ranges.

But what about hands like TT? The basic assumptions I use when playing against passive players seemed obvious. The next question would be about a hand like JJ or AK. Each of us has bb. Folding JJ to a 3bet might seem extremely weak and exploitable. Low cards often rely on implied odds. If you see somebody c-bet and then give up with 86s on a A53J9 board as the preflop 3-bettor. How low we can go in terms of both high cards and pairs depends on how lightly somebody is 3-betting us.

The second half of this book will discuss it more thoroughly. Their hot-cold equity is worse. You can use discretion as for how low you want to go.

Being in position means that we can call 3-bets. We raise in the CO preflop and a tight-aggressive.This leads us towards a major conclusion: If somebody is sitting on only one or two tables.

So why are we trying to isolate ourselves with the guy who plays pretty well? I hated it when I read about someone getting lucky straight off the bat. He led again for pot. Any time you take an action at a poker table, you should be able to explain it in 20 seconds worth of timeonline, thats all the time youll get in the first place. The turn card was an A. All we have is a pair of sixes.